The Structure of Urban Land Administration during the Bubble Economy : Control Systems and Their Operations by Fukuoka Shunji
Comprehensive Urban Studies No. 62 1997 
The Structure of Urban Land Administration 
during the Bubble Economy : 
Control Systems and Their Operations 
Shunji Fukuoka * 
1. Introduction 
165 
In this article the author examines Japanese land administration， its structure， 
operation and the problems it creates during the bubble economy. The author focuses 
on the issues of land transaction control and systems to manage idle land. 
The most recent series of land price rises began in Tokyo's central commercial districts 
some time in 19851)." But this was not the first time that land process had skyrocketed 
in Japan; in fact it was the third “bubble" since WWII. The first (Bubble 1) ballooned 
between 1960 and 1961 when the Income Doubling Plan began. The second (Bubble 2) 
formed between 1971 to 1974 when prime minister Kakuei Tanaka's plan to remodel the 
Japanese archipelago touched off frenzied speculation. This third one (Bubble 3)， 
however， far exceeded the others in both scale and consequence. Land prices in Tokyo 
became the most outrageous in the world 2). 
Although Bubble 2 spread to the whole country， Bubble 3 mainly affected land prices in 
the Tokyo Region3). The primary reason for the creation of the bubble was the 
functional overconcentration of economic， social and political power in Tokyo. Demand 
for office space sharply increased in central Tokyo in the mid-1980s and was further 
stimulated by investment in real estate (for the purpose of property ownership) and 
short-term land speculation backed by low interest rates and a surplus of money. One 
particular land lot was bought and sold 4 times in 10 months. 
The government was also at fault. Through its policies of deregulation and private-
sector vitalization， the government sold state-owned land lots (e.g. land owned by the 
national railway) through auctioning. The unreasonably high prices commanded by 
these lots had a ripple effect on land prices in neighboring areas. The Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government (TMG)， which felt the effects of Bubble 3 earlier on， was 
quicker in its response than the national government4). In October 1986 the TMG 
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enacted an ordinance on fair land transactions to mandate the notification of 
transactions of smallland lots (less than 2，000 square meters) and implemented it in the 
5 central wards in December the same year. The number of wards covered by the 
ordinance was increased to 14 in January 1987; to a1l23 wards plus 2 cities in April; and 
to 23 wards and 13 cities in July that year. 
TMG's ordinance was the first in the country to address the issue of land transaction 
prices-although it covered only the price and not the purpose of the land transaction. 
The TMG's notification system was followed by the amendment of the National Land 
Utilization Planning Law by the National Land Agency in August 1987. At this point， we 
should briefly review the history of this agency and the National Land Utilization 
Planning Law. 
The National Land Agency was established in 1974， during Bubble 2 and was empowered 
to formulate basic land use plans. The National Land Utilization PlanningLaw C‘Land 
Law')， enacted in conjunction with the establishment of the National Land Agency， 
aimed to“stipulate matters necessary in formulating the National Land Use Plan， 
formulate land use basic plans， take measures to control land transactions and to 
coordinate land use， thereby promoting comprehensive and planned use of the national 
land CArticle 1)." The law includes articles on the National Land Use Plan， land use 
basic plans， permission and notification of transfer of rights on land and measures for 
idle land. Article 12 in this law is particularly significant in that it authorizes 
prefectural governors to slap the definition of “Control District" on any area where 
land prices have sharply increased due to speculative dealings. In areas other than the 
Control District， notification of sales Ctransfer of rights) of land lots was required 
CArticle 23). Within the Control District the governor can reject transactions where the 
price and use purpose is not fair and can thus stop speculative dealings. As described 
later， however， this system has never been used. 
The Land Law underwent a major amendment in 1987 with the establishment of the 
Surveillance District System CArticle 27). Under this system the prefectural governor 
can label as a “Surveillance District" any area where land prices have sharply increa-
sed Cor are likely to increase) and where the fair and rational use of land is likely be 
hampered. Other amendments included the revision of systems to control speculative 
short-term transactions and facilitate the use of idle land. 
The amendment of the Land Law was followed by the enactment of the Basic Land Act， 
sometimes referred to as the “Constitution" of land， inDecember 1989. The Basic Land 
Act stipulates policy guidelines for the national and local governments and norms for 
conduct for the citizens and businesses with regard to land.The Act sets four basic 
principles: a) priority given to public welfare in land use， b) fair and planned use of 
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land， c)control of speculative dealings， and d) an appropriate bearing of burdens in 
accordance with benefits gained. 
By the time the government had prepared these tools to tackle the land problem， the 
land price hike in central Tokyo and the commercial districts of the three metropolitan 
regions had already peaked. These tools to control short-term land resale and these 
systems to facilitate the use of idle land were considered to be emergency measures 
only. In later years the introduction of the Control District system was discussed by a 
study group formed jointly by the National Land Agency and prefectures and 
municipalities in the Tokyo region5). But this too was after the land prices had peaked. 
The capping of prices of land sold by the government had to wait until the August 1987 
decision on the amendment of the Land Law， following repeated requests from the 
TMG. Even then， implementation did not come until November 1991. 
All these examples show that the national government was slow in taking measures 
involving land. And when measures were taken， they tended to be symptomatic and did 
not lead to any effective solutions. The sectionalism within the national government 
was partly to blame. The National Land Agency lacked sufficient power to take the 
initiative and coordinate with the Ministry of Construction， Ministry of Agriculture， 
Forestry and Fisheries， Ministry of Finance and other related ministries and agencies6). 
Land policies including restrictions on land transactions， financial regulations and land 
tax systems coexisted without any effective interaction and any effort of coordination. 
Land prices themselves are a significant example of the lack of intra-governmental 
coordination in this country. Japan has， basically， four types of officially evaluated 
land price besides the market price: a) the posted land price (koji chikα) announced 
based on the Land Price Publication Law; b) the land price determined based on the 
Land Law (助runchikα) c) the land price used to determine the amount of inheritance 
tax (rosenka) and d) the land price to determine the amount of property tax 
(hyokαgαku). 
The latter two are determined by the Ministry of Finance Ci.e. its tax administration 
agency). Ministry of Finance policies influence other land policies. Unfortunately 
however， this ministry made the fatal mistake of lagging behind in financial1iberaliza-
tion and internationalization. Although some have said that the restrictive lending 
policies imposed during Bubble 3 helped curb bubble growth， these policies set the stage 
for a disastrous financial failure by opening up funding routes for housing loan 
companies (Jusen) and financial institutions affiliated to agricultural cooperatives7). 
People outside Japan may wonder why the Japanese failed again to address the land 
issues during Bubble 3 despite al the restraints described above. To answer this 
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question the author shall focus on the Surveillance District System in the following 
section， its implementation and what problems it faced. The author will analyze the 
factors which obstructed the implementation of a comprehensive urban policy and land 
administration. 
2. Structure and Function of the Surveillance District System 
A system to controlland transactions was first introduced in 1974， during Bubble 2， by 
the Land Law8). This was the first attempt by the government to intervene in land 
transactions. Under this law， land transactions are controlled by three major 
measures: a) the Control District=Permission System (Article 12・17); b) the 
Notification System CArticle 23・27);and c) Control on Idle Land (Article 28-35). The 
first two， a)and b)， were to allow the government， which traditionally restricted only 
the act of development Cand not the sale of land)， to go overstep that boundary and 
control the land transactions themselves9). 
The Control District and Notification System required coordination among the 
government sectors responsible for land transactions， finance and taxation， and the 
macroeconomic policy of the central bank. The agency that assumed this role of 
coordinator was the National Land Agencyl0). 
Let us take a look at these measures， one by one， tosee how they worked during Bubble 
3. The Notification System under the 1974 Land Law was targeted at the entire country. 
It required notification to the governor of any transactions of land involving an area of 
2，000 square meters or greaterll); or more precisely 2，000 square meters or over in the 
urbanization promotion area， 5，000 square meters or over in other city planning areas 
and 10，000 square meters or over in rural areas. The Notification System therefore 
benefited corporations and owners of large land holdingsl2) 
Most of the land lots transacted in central Tokyo during Bubble 3 were small， ranging 
from 100 square meters to 300 square metersI3). Thus under the 1974 notification system 
only a litle over 10% of the entire land lots transacted were reported 14). This point 
alone illustrates that during Bubble 3 the Notification System was a totally ineffective 
administrative tool for controlling speculative land dealings in central Tokyo. 
What was the National Land Agency trying to achieve by introducing a more powerful 
tool， the Control District C =Permission System)? The answer lies in a report on land 
use compiled by a study group set up by the Agency during Bubble 3 and chaired by 
Professor Shunsuke Ishihara of the Science University of Tokyo. 
The initial purpose of the Control District under the 1974 law was to prohibit al land 
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transactions in certain designated areas except those for limited purposes Cfor 
expropriation projects or to construct housing for people living in the area). Such 
a “bold" measure might have had great influence on land dealings and economic 
activities as a whole. However， al the power to set Control Districts was given to the 
Prime Minister， effectively removing the governors from the lOOpI5). These powers 
to prohibit al land transactions in certain designated areas were seen as something 
kept aside for emergency use only. The officials of the Land Agency from the outset 
considered the Control District system to be a last resort and not to be used except 
under the direst of circumstancesI6). No list of criteria or procedures for the applica-
tion of this system were ever provided 17). 
The land use study group was rather cautious in the designation of the Control District， 
saying that the low notification ratio in a given area was not sufficient to justify to 
assign a Control District. To tackle Bubble 3 the study group then proposed the 
Surveillance District System as an alternativeI8). “…The establishment of the Control 
District requires careful consideration because once established， itwill have a strong 
controlling effect. A low notification rate alone to begin with will not fulfil the 
requirement for designation of an area as a Control District. To address the issue of 
land price hikes in metropolitan built-up areas we require a new system positioned 
somewhere between the notification system and the Control District. One such example 
may be a system to reduce the size of the land lot where notification is mandated within 
a certain period of time， and to require notification when such land lot is transacted.... 
Cunderlined by the author)" The study group went on to propose that a reduction in 
the land area to be notified should be flexible， tomeet local conditions. 
The land use study group's ideas were compiled into a proposal calling for the 
prefectural governors to be given the power to set the following: l)the minimum size of 
land lot where notification to the authorities was compulsory， 2)the area of the lot and 
3) the period to which the requirement should be applied 19). In reply to concerns that 
this power to controlland development would hamper the private sector， the study 
group replied:“…there would be more merits than demerits if this system is properly 
operated and is not abused" 20). The study group gave the following reasons for this 
stance20:“..firstly， this administrative tool is to be used to 'give advice' on notified 
land transactions that have unreasonably high prices or imprudent goals; not to 
'control' the private sector. Secondly， the current trend of land price increase is 
harming the quality of city planning and urban redevelopment and may spread to the 
surrounding residential areas. The balanced development of the regional community 
may be adversely affected if， which is often the case these days， the majority of funds 
for development is spent on land acquisition rather than more productive purposes." 
Based on the proposals of this study group， the National Land Agency amended 
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the Land Law and established the Surveillance District System in June 1987. This 
“intermediate" system， or a tool of administrative guidanceCnot control)， now meant 
that any area to be designated as a Control District first had be assigned as a 
Surveillance District23). Again， the motive for this decision was to avoid the use of the 
Control District. 
Let us examine the structure and functions of the Surveillance District System. The 
need for “comprehensive policy" was first called upon in August 1986 by a TMG 
committee for the examination of fair land transactions as a premise for introducing a 
control on small-scale land lot transactions based on the TMG ordinance24). The 
Surveillance District System however， isnot a comprehensive land policy but a 
symptomatic measure. Under this system the authorities have the power to advise 
parties not to proceed with transactions considered to involve “unsuitable land prices 
and purposes" within a monitored district. Why was this system introduced before any 
other type of specific land policy? 
There are several reasons. Firstly， the National Land Agency was mistrustful of the 
Ministry of Finance's policies， particularly ones restricting loans to real estate 
companies. While negotiating with the Ministry of Finance， the National Land Agency 
lost the opportunity to implement more effective measures while land prices were stil 
high25). Secondly， the interim report submitted by the Extraordinary Council on 
Administrative Reform in 198726) proposed that the government should take direct 
measures to control speculative land transactions; by strengthening real estate dealer 
guidance by putting a freeze on sales of national and public land. The Council assumed 
that short-term effects could only be expected by direct control and administrative 
guidance by the government. In other words， the council implied that only the 
government could change its private-sector vitalization policies， promoted by Prime 
Minister Nakasone， which had gone too far. An example of the kind of land sale the 
Council wished to prevent is the sale of Japan National Railway land at excessively high 
prices， which was blamed for pushing up the price of land in central Tokyo27). 
Thirdly， based on the report from the Council and the power struggle within the 
government and in the Diet， more emphasis was placed on land transaction control 
proposed by the National Land Agency rather than on land tax reform. Land tax 
reform， which might have offered better solutions to the land problem was postponed. 
Instead， the Surveillance District System was promoted as the easiest to implement 
measure to address land problems. 
Let us take a look at how the Surveillance District System works. The System is based 
on notification and recommendation via administrative guidance. Notified land lots are 
examined in terms of two criteria: purpose of use and price. 
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A recommendation on purpose of use is made when “the notified land lot is likely to 
significantly hamper the proper and rational use of land in the surrounding area." To 
be more specific:“when the use of the notified land lot is not in line with the basic plan 
or other plans on land use" and “when the use of the notified land lot is not in line with 
the public facilities to be improved or with the conservation of the surrounding natural 
environment." But the land use basic plan， to begin with， isvague and lacks specific 
land use guidelines. As a result， this procedure cannot be expected to produce effective 
recommendations28) •
At last there came a more powerful tool for the control of speculative land transac-
tions: the 1989 amendment of the Land Law， or the second amendment of the law to 
address Bubble 3. This amendment added a new criteria for the government recommen-
dations to be made for land transaction: screening of short-term resale of land for 
speculative purposes. But again， there was a limit to its operation29). By the time this 
system to control short-term land resale was introduced， the land prices in central 
Tokyo had already peaked. 
We should question the basis by which transacted land prices were to be “advised" by 
the government. In the Surveillance District “significantly inadequate" reported prices 
of land lots are to receive advice. What this“significantly inadequate" price shall be 
left to the discretion of the governor. 
This “significantly inadequate" price raises several problems. Firstly， the criteria of 
recommendation is the “posted land price." Secondly， this posted price does not reflect 
the market price(It is set far lower than the market price). Thirdly， the guidance price 
upon which the notified price is reviewed is discretely set， based on the posted price. 
The guidance price is“the upper limit of the price" that the government thinks should 
be applied in the transaction. Nevertheless， the dealers interpreted this price being a 
“proper price" endorsed by the government30) and not an upper limit. 
Moreover， the process of screening notified land transactions is like a “black box." 
Citizens do not have access to any information on the screening process. This is 
because the notification is not to “control" but to “guide" specula tive dealings3D • 
Citizensdo not have access to the information on the “jiage" (the artificial jacking-up 
of land prices) land prices. Such information is deemed private and thus is not 
disclosed. Administration of land price information iscommissioned by the national 
government to prefectures. The prefectures are not given the right to freely disclose 
such information32). 
Indeed， information on land transaction， land price setting is very difficult to obtain in 
Japan. For one thing， the real estate market in this country consists of numerous 
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small-scale operators and it is difficult to get an overall picture of the micro-dealings 
which go on among this mass of small businessmen33). 
One useful source of information on land transactions is published by the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government under the title “Land in the Tokyo Metropolis." This report 
is published annually and contains detailed information on land ownership， land use， 
land transactions and land prices in the Tokyo Metropolis. The author has referred to 
the 1988 version which features a survey on land transactions in four wards and four 
cities of Tokyo. 
According to the 1988 report， the majority of transactions took place among corpora-
tions， real estate dealers in particular. The report classifies land lots transactions by 
purpose of use: residential， commercial or business. This data does not tel us which 
type of land lots are targets of short-term speculative dealings. The supplemental data 
shows us that the resale rate (the ratio of land lots resold within two years of those lots 
initially sold to the total number of transactions) for Minato Ward peaked in 1986 at a 
high as 42.7%. The highest rate of 30.5% for the DID district Ci.e. downtown) in 
Machida City in Tokyo's suburb was recorded a year later in 1987. The land lots are 
typically first sold by individualland owners to companies， then resold to real estate 
companies. Thirdly， the majority of lots were small in scale; over half were less than 
100 square meters and over two-thirds were smaller than 300 square meters. 
The next index is the administrative guidance rate. This is calculated by dividing the 
number of notified land lots， where the government considers the price or purpose 
inadequate and gives administrative guidance (recommendations， etc.)， by the total 
number of notified land lots. Transactions involving real estate dealers as the buyer 
and the seller tend to have the highest administrative guidance rate. These are followed 
by dealings between corporations and financial institutions. The figure for transac-
tions between individual citizens tend to be much lower. 
Why was administrative guidance through the notification-recommendation system 
effective? Professor Y oichi Ohashi points out that the “notice of non-recommendation" 
described in Article 24-3 of the Land Law functioned as an incentive to notify34). This 
section stipulates that if the prefectural governor thinks that the notified land lot 
transaction is“fair and rational" and the recommendation is unnecessary， then he 
shall issue a notice of non-recommendation to the person who made the notification， 
without delay. Upon request from the National Land Agency， the Ministry of Finance 
requests financial institutions to require real estate dealers to show this notice when 
they request loans for land development to check that the money is not going to“unf 
air and irrational" speculative dealings35). In other words， fuzzy administrative 
guidance， instead of strict control， put pressure on real estate companies to notify 
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voluntarily. In addition， recommendation were made public and companies receiving 
recommendations may have had trouble continuing in business due to negative 
publicity. So in a way， this system has worked through the force of social sanctions. 
This control on land transactions at least prevented land price rises from getting out of 
control altogether， although it could not directly control speculative dealing. Through 
“advice" the prefectures built up experience and established rules of administrative 
guidance and prices. Dealers were warned to stop asking for “significantly inade-
quate" prices. Of course this rule had a loophole: dealers could increase the profit a bit 
by bit within an “adequate" price range. And thus land prices snowballed even though 
the “price" was controlled36). (Another common loophole that dealers used was to 
notifyan “adequate" price to the prefecture and then pay unrecorded extra money to 
the landowner.) 
Secondly， commissions， registration fees and other transaction expenses increased 
hand in hand with land price rises. This somewhat discouraged real estate companies 
from becoming overly involved in short-term land transactions. 
Thirdly， as transaction control came under the Surveillance District System， inspection 
of dealers and administrative control over their activities was stepped up. It should be 
noted， however， that the lirik between the prefecture authorities in charge of land 
transactions and the authorities in charge of real estate dealers is stil inadequate. 
The adverse effects of transaction control were revealed once land prices started to 
decline37}. The Surveillance District System has prevented the fal in land prices. Critics 
claim that the system should be abolished. To this the government argues that the 
Surveillance District System and other land policies at work are not symptomatic 
measures to controlland price rises: they are， instead， aimed at providing a structural 
framework for measures to stabilize land price rises andpromote the proper use of 
land. We shall yet leave to see the “fate" of the Surveillance District System; when and 
how it will be abolished. 
3. The Unplanned and Unused Land System and Urban Land Use Control 
Unplanned and Unused Land System is a system to facilitate the use of unplanned and 
unused land 10ts38). Under this system the owner of a land lot of a certain size (for 
example， a land lot of 1，000 square meters or larger in the Urbanization Promotion 
Area) who has owned that land for more than two years and has done nothing with it 
may be recommended or advised by the prefectural governor (or the governor may 
recommend or advise) to“utilize" that land lot “respecting the willingness of that 
owner." This is a kind of “follow-up" method to the land purpose of use examination 
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which is conducted when the purchase of land is first reported to the government39). 
The thinking behind this system is that public intervention at the time land is bought 
and sold is insufficient to guarantee rationalland use; even after the land lot is sold， the 
government should continue to keep an eye on it to avoid it simply being held in an idle 
state by the owner. In this context the National Land Agency launched this system 
to“actively control land use" (0). This system， however， can do nothing more than 
simply “recommend and advise." If the land owner wants to continue holding that land 
lot while doing nothing with it， the system is powerless to act4I). It should be noted that 
the Japanese land use system has no other direct method to promote the use of 
unplanned and unused land. Land use can only be promoted by indirect measures such 
as: a) case-by-case negotiations between the government (or the developer) and the 
land owner over the purchase of the unplanned and unused land; and b) designation of 
the land lot as city plan area so that the land price in the designated area increases， 
making the land owner willing to sel. This is why the system functions only as a 
“follow-up" to land transactions(2). 
The system is not attractive for administrators either. Even when a land lot is 
designa ted as an “idle" lot， there is no further city planning tool to allow the prefecture 
to purchase that land， nor there is any financial scheme to allow the prefecture or 
municipality to buy “idle" land. Without these incentives the local governments tend to 
be unwilling to even survey and designate land lots as being idle or otherwise in the first 
place. 
In fact， a great gap exists between the land area officially surveyed and designated as 
being “unplanned and unused" and that which is idle but not recorded as SUCh(3). This 
is due to the notion that“use" is the same as “development" (4). Most unused land held 
by corporations are defined as unplanned and unused during the screening process of 
designation. Local governments are to be blamed for this shortcoming. The system has 
great potential for local governments as a mechanism to increase the area of public 
land and create new patterns of land use. The great task local governments face now 
is: 1) how to come up with ideas for future land use and city planning， and 2) how they 
can exert their power vis-a-vis the powerful national government. 
How has the Unplanned and Unused Land System been operated? The Management 
and Coordination Agency conducted an administrative inspection on the system and 
pointed out that the system “is not sufficient1y utilized" (5) for the following two 
reasons(6): a) some unplanned and unused land lots have been left idle for a long period 
of time due to insufficient advice and guidance from prefectures; and b) when the 
prefecture cannot determine whether how land lot should be designated， itis kept 
pending as“a land lot to continue to be examined" (but there is no unified criteria 
Fukuoka: The Structure of Urban Land Administration during the Bubble Economy 175 
among prefectures for such a designation). 
In fact， 164 cases involving a total of 193.7 ha of land in 24 prefectures were kept pending 
as “a land lot to continue to be examined" between 1988 and 1990 whereas only 10 cases 
(or 7.1 ha) were designated and notified as being“unplanned and unused" 47). 
The Management and Coordination Agency also noted the lack of comprehensive 
surveys on state land and land possessed by corporations. Regarding state land， again， 
due to sectionalism， each government ministry and agency owns land and has separate 
plans for the land use. No governments (national or local) have conducted a 
satisfactory survey on the land use plans to serve as a basis for effective master plans 
and land use plans. Government's“strong commitment" to the promotion of land use 
is thus not reflected in policies， plans and tools to facilitate the use of idle land or 
preserve or increase land for residential purposes. 
A survey by the National Land Agency's Metropolitan Areas Development Bureau 
conducted in June 1994 (" An emergency survey on idle land in central Tokyoつ48)
revealed that the total area of idle land (the total of idle land lots of 300 square meters 
and over) in the centralll wards of Tokyo (Chiyoda， Chuo， Minato， Shinjuku， Bunkyo， 
Taito， Sumida， Shinagawa， Shibuya and Toshima) came to 130 hectares. This area 
increases when we include 310 hectares of under-utilized open-air storage places and 
open-air parking spaces and 470 hectares of under-utilized plant and warehouse space. 
Thus we find that there may be as much as 910 hectares of idle land in central Tokyo. 
Over one-fourth of this area， or 230 hectares consists of land lots with an area of 
between 300 square meters and 1，000 square meters， for which notification of idleness is 
not required by Article 28 of the Land Law. 
The adverse effect of the land bubble is obvious in these figures. The National Land 
Agency noted in the survey above that“this significant amount of idle land is a factor 
of uncertainty in considering the future of central Tokyo and makes it difficult to 
conduct long-term， planned metropolitan development." 
As we have seen， the Unplanned and Unused Land System has no power even as a 
“follow-up" to land transactions. We can say that the system itself is idle; rather than 
facilitating the use of land， this system leaves land as it is. 
The Unplanned and Unused Land System itself is not to blame. The real culprits are a 
lack of principle， image and philosophy of land use plans， both on the part of the 
national and local governments. This fact relates to the issues of administrative reform 
and in turn the issue of the restructuring of the national government to allow more 
comprehensive and effective land administration and more power to local governments. 
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4. Land Use Plans 
Japanese city plans and land use plans have never been based on some desirable image 
of a city or some idealliving environment. Land use patterns have never been created 
based on a plan. Land prices have never been shaped in accordance with the uses set in 
the plan49). The Land Law of 1974 did not serve to guide such land plans， use patterns 
and land prices. The Basic Land Act has not yet changed this situation50). ln fact， some 
critics claim that the Basic Land Act is only a first step to create a truly comprehensive 
land use plan5o. Land and houses are not supplied on a stable basis according to a plan 
formulated in response to urban growth and development. ln the long run， the balanced 
development of Japanese cities has been hampered. 
Plans have been unable to catch up with land use patterns. Land use is guided by the 
market price of the land. If a certain land lot becomes too expensive and people living 
on that land lot can no longer hold it， itis sold to a developer who then erects an office 
building. Such market-driven development has made good city planning impossible52). 
The urban “land price revolution" is the real culprit; it created a situation where the 
market price of land far exceeded the base price above which profit could be made53). 
“Land in the Tokyo Metropolis 1988" noted that the market price as of 1988， at the 
peak of the land bubble， had far exceeded the profit-making land price in the central 
commercial districts and the difference between the market price and profit-making 
land price was stil expanding54). The report further stated that the gap was even 
greater for residential land than commercial land. Based on the report the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government actually requested the government to do something to stop 
further increases. 
The national government's land price announcement system and land tax system 
did not address this problem. The national government did not survey this trend. There 
is yet no official information on the gap between the market land price and the 
profit-making land price5). The administrative inspection by the Management and 
Coordination Agency pointed out this issue and sent a warning signal (although it was 
rather late) 56). lndeed the land problem is a “disease" caused by bureaucracy and 
sectionalism (as shown in the case of putting four prices on the same land lot) that 
hamper “comprehensive" land policies in addition to inadequate macroeconomic 
management by the banking authorities57). It should be noted that the conventional 
financial system of this country ， taking land as collateral， has long supported land 
speculation and has hampered rationalland use58). 
Another issue that requires further discussion is the nature and the system of land use 
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planning. Friction and competition between land use for commercial purposes and for 
residential purposes cannot be avoided under the market mechanism. Thus plans are 
required to control this mechanism. Plans should be formulated from the grass-roots 
level Cbottom-up) to make them truly “public" 59). “Top-down" plans formulated by 
the national government， lack of district-level master plan and sectionalized admini-
stration have made it difficult for citizens to take the initiative in improving the area in 
which they live60). Due to the failure of systems to produce city plans， attempts to 
tighten control usually ends up easing restrictions， even after the Basic Land Act was 
enacted61) . 
Again， the Basic Land Act is only “the first step" for a truly effective land reform62). 
1s there no hope then ? 
We should encourage efforts to increase financial control， to unify and coordinate 
information on land， and to gather and analyze more detailed land price data. Through 
these efforts， issues to be addressed by land tax system reform are clarified. 
What should be pointed out， at the end of this article， isthat the National Land Agency， 
for the first time since it was established some 29 years ago， isshowing willingness and 
commitment to break the ministerial sectionalism and come up with innovations and 
tools to implement more comprehensive land policies63). There is finally a sign， after 
trials and errors in land policies， of uniting efforts to establish land price monitoring 
system and to guide land prices to more adequate levels. Steps taken by the Agency 
however， are stil far from successful. 
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